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ABSTRACT

The paper examines the relationship between teacher empowerment and educational philosophy, noting questions regarding the corporate and technological demands on schools as well as questions about liberal education, cultural literacy, pluralism, perspectivism, and multiplicity. It stresses the importance of teachers reflecting on their work in order to have freedom in relation to what they do. The paper suggests an educational philosophy that says too little about lived experience and relationships, and whose standpoint is too constricted. Teachers confronting their own helplessness under the weight of bureaucratic supervision and control may ask themselves about their sense of being manipulated from without, wondering what it signifies in tneir vision of education. They must consider whether, in their powerlessness, they intend to teach for communities of the competent or communities of citizens. They must ask whether they can think relationally and be connected in a social world. Teachers willing to confront the questions that philosophy poses rather than simply remake the familiar are likely to become explorers and interpreters rather than transmitters of received ideas. Through their teaching, they can create a sense of authorship in the world. Teachers are always confronted with moral and ethical situations which require them to decide what is good and right and to nurture ethical sensitivity in students. They must confront the moral challenge facing society in order to avoid a world that is comfortable but that denies what is decent and humane. They can do something about the desire to submerge in a comfortable life, the tendency to believe blindly, and the dedication to profit. (SM)

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Educational Philosophy and Teacher Empowerment

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To do educational philosophy is to pose what have been called "queer questions"[1] with respect to what we, as teachers, are doing in this world. "Queer questions" are those that cannot be answered empirically or logically. They differ both from social scientific questions and from those that can be resolved within a formal or mathematical system. Indeed, once they are translated into the kinds of problems that can be settled through observation or experiment, or through purely logical or linguistic analysis, they are no longer philosophical. As I view them, they must be posed in the midst of life and from the situated vantage points of human beings existing in some "we-relation"[2] in a world they share. They become significant when they are raised with a clear sense of context, of the interpreted experience conceived of as "reality." Hannah Arendt, in her "Prologue" to The Human Condition, may make it clearest when she writes that she is concerned with a "reconsideration of the human condition from the vantage point of our newest experiences and our most recent fears." She goes on: "This, obviously, is a matter of thought, and thoughtlessness - the heedless recklessness or hopeless confusion or complacent repetition of 'truths' which have become trivial and empty - seems to me among the outstanding characteristics of our time. What I propose, therefore, is very simple: it is nothing more than to think what we are doing."[3]

What does this sort of thinking have to do with teacher empowerment? It seems to me, in the first place, that we would not be preoccupied with empowerment if we did not believe that teachers were somehow caught up by the complex play of mechanisms Michel Foucault described as a "technology of power." He did not mean power exerted by one man or several at the apex of a structure, "some identifiable individual or group of individuals who decide to implement it so as to further their interests or facilitate their utilization of the social body...."[4] He meant that which characterized a mode of discourse dominant at a particular time, or the ordered procedures for the production and distribution of statements that added up to "truth," or even the systems of examination that determined what was acceptable and what was required of everyone willing to be "normalized." Teachers, and many other workers in the human services, feel themselves enmeshed somehow in almost invisible programs or systems of hegemony. Viewing the impacts of power in that fashion, it is not surprising that Foucault emphasized the importance of thought. Thought, he said, "is what allows one to step back from this way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought and question it as to its meaning, its conditions, and its goals. Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, and reflects on it as a problem.[5] In examining some of the uses of educational philosophy, I am going to explore this notion along with Hannah Arendt's, because both strike me as being potentially emancipatory. I want also to look at the questions that have so much to do with teachers' self-definition in these days: those having to do with the technological and corporate demands pressing down on the schools; those having to do with liberal education, with "cultural literacy," with pluralism, with perspectivism, with multiplicity.

To speak of self-definition is to open up one of the significant domains in philosophy: namely, the consideration of what might be called the "human reality." Obviously, we are surrounded on all sides by descriptions of human nature and modes of behavior, as we are by accounts of diverse cultures. These, however, do not answer the age-old question, "What is man

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that thou are mindful of him?" Or the necessary question that completes the other: "What is woman?" They do not respond to Hamlet's outcry when he recalls the rendering of the human being as the "paragon of animals" and then asks, "And what is he to me, this quintessence of dust?" Nor the query inherent in poet Muriel Rukeyser's lines: "What would happen if one woman told the truth about her life? The world would split open." Nor the fearsome questions being raised today about the barbarism lurking below the surfaces, the repressed violence, the narcissism, the absence of concern.

There are, in educational philosophy, many analytic and linguistic approaches centering around the clarification of the concept of the individual, the concept of the person. Confusions may be cleared up when, say, R. S. Peters stresses the idea that the concept of a 'person' implies the existence of a "center of consciousness - a center of choice and evaluation."[6] At a moment when so many of those preoccupied with the nation's economic competitiveness are calling the young "human resources," the philosopher's may be a useful reminder. Still, Peters' approach is typically detached and cool; it is the viewpoint of the rigorous philosophical observer, distanced from lived reality in all its ambiguity and uncertainty. Not surprisingly, he posits cognitive excellence as a prime goal of education; and he says repeatedly that the concept of education "implies the intentional bringing about of a desirable state of mind."[7] The view of what is most worthwhile and the emphasis on "state of mind" both assume the importance of rationality, autonomy, and clarity above all things. Like other analytic philosophers concerned with the meaning of terms and the clarification of concepts, Peters shows little concern for the concreteness of a world racked by inequities and fragmentations, as he evinces little interest in praxis or the difference it might make in such a world. For him and his colleagues, liberal education involves an initiation into the forms of knowledge, and this is identified with the development of mind.[8] Even as I would grant the importance of cognition and the uses of concept clarification, however, I find constricted and even sterile an educational philosophy that says so little about lived experience, standpoint, and relationship.

Some of the "queer questions" have to do with the view of liberal education developed within the analytic frame; but, before posing them, I want to raise the question of how teachers choose themselves in the first place, what they choose themselves to be. For John Dewey, Hannah Arendt, Paulo Freire, and existential philosophers like Jean Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, no concept can encompass the human reality. Dewey wrote that "the self is not something ready-made, but something in continuous formation through choice of action...."[9] For Arendt, nothing entitles us to assume that human beings have "a nature or essence in the same sense as other things." For her, the conditions of our existence can never "explain" what we are or answer the question of who we are "for the simple reason that they never condition us absolutely."[10] Unlike the analysts, these people see the living being dynamically in open situations. Paulo Freire said that "humanization," after all, is the central problem as we live.[11] We are conscious of our incompleteness and of our vocation, which is to affirm ourselves as persons and overcome alienation, even as we see the alternative possibility of dehumanization. Humanization has to do with naming the world and transforming it; it is through dialogue that we achieve our significance as human beings.[12] This is in accord with Sartre's view of our having continually to choose ourselves against objectness, to seek out our freedom in a resisting world.[13] And Merleau-Ponty, in his turn, viewing human beings in an ongoing dialectic relation with the forces that determine, wrote: "It is by being unrestrictedly and unreservedly what I am at present that I have a chance of moving forward; it is by living my time that I am able to understand other times, by plunging into the present and the world, by taking on deliberately what I am fortuitously, by willing what I will and doing what I do that I can go further."[14] At length he said that only through choice and action could we cut loose from anchorage.

Teachers confronting their own submergence, feeling weary, often, and helpless under the weight of bureaucratic supervision and control, might ask themselves about their own weariness, their sense of being manipulated from without. And, in asking, they might wonder what this signifies with regard to their vision of educating - of knowing, of valuing, of imagining what might be. Are they, in their own felt powerlessness, training those Arendt called "jobholders and consumers"?[15] Do they intend to teach for communities of the competent, or for communities of citizens?[16] Just as importantly, do they see themselves teaching insular children, islands of autonomy in an intersubjective world? Do they themselves choose themselves as separate, self-sufficient, creatures of an individualist ideology, mystified by laissez-faire? Or can they think relationally and choose themselves in connectedness as participants in a social world?[16] There are no right or wrong responses to questions like these. They are philosophical questions, existential questions. A thoughtfulness is required of those risking responses, those willing "to step back from this way of acting and reacting....," to break for a moment with the automatic and the habitual, to go in search.

From the classical age in Ancient Greece to the recent events in China's Tiananmen Square, there have been images and incidents of people breaking with illusion or automatism or domination, deliberately opening spaces in which to choose. We might think of the prisoners breaking loose in the cave rendered in Plato's Republic and of their difficult ascent to the sunlight, of men and women throughout Europe refusing superstition and authoritative rule in the 18th century, of working people in this country insisting on a vote, on being heard. We might recall the Civil Rights movement and the high moments of the women's movement. All these are instances of individual human beings coming together, giving form to their discontents, breaking with the "everydayness" of their ordinary lives, choosing the search. The narrator in Walker Percy's The Moviegoer says: "To become aware of the possibility of the search is to be onto something. Not to be onto something is to be in despair."[17] Albert Camus warned of this despair when he wrote of the mind keeping silent "in the motionless world of its hopes...." But then he said, "with its first move this world cracks and tumbles: an infinite number of shimmering fragments is offered to the understanding. We must despair of ever reconstructing the familiar, calm surface which would give us peace of heart."[18] Only professional rationalists, he said, can offer abstract and generalized certainties. "That universal reason, practical or ethical, that determinism, those categories that explain everything are enough to make a decent man laugh. They have nothing to do with the mind."

Teachers willing to confront the "shimmering fragments offered to the understanding" rather than taking refuge in remaking "the familiar, calm surface" of things are teachers likely to choose themselves as explorers and interpreters, not merely transmitters of received ideas. They are likely to be the kinds of teachers who would feel that the sub-title of E. D. Hirsch, Jr.'s Cultural Literacy is enough to make a decent person laugh. You may recall: "What Every American Needs to Know" and perhaps wonder at any person making such a claim. Moving into the philosophic domain in which questions are to be posed about knowing and knowledge, meaning, truth, imagination, reason, intuition and belief, such teachers may react with skepticism to the Hirschian emphasis on content or "facts," the scorn of "critical thinking," the disinterest in process.[19] For one thing, more and more doubts have been expressed in the last decades with regard to what is called the "correspondence theory of truth,"[20] meaning that a true statement is required to correspond to something existing objectively in the outside world.

The very notion of objectivity, in fact, has been challenged significantly in ways of great significance for conceptions of teaching; since the challenge turns attention away from an abstract ideal or some non-human reality to what Richard Rorty describes as a

"solidarity" with a chosen community, with the concrete persons around.[21] This appears to make problematic efforts to establish rational frameworks in which all disagreements or conflicts can be finally resolved. Even the kind of foundation implicitly identified with "cultural literacy" becomes questionable in a pluralist, uncertain world. There is a place, of course, for reason in the effecting of relationships, and creating provisional orders; but the focus, when it comes to the knowledge undertaking, is on lived experience and the sense-making within situations the quest for meaning requires. To do philosophy with regard to this is to become aware of the range of ways of knowing and the "province of meaning"[22] each one sets forth. The idea of a hierarchy of knowing or understanding gives way to the idea of multiple perspectives, each one made possible by the "cognitive style" distinctive of each province of meaning - that of the natural sciences, that of the social sciences, that of the arts and humanities. Moving into any one of these spaces, persons retain a sense of their biographies, their background stories, as they are aware of their locations in the social world. Engaging, for instance, with works of history or literature in the realm of the humanities, they learn to inquire and conceptualize and imagine according to the norms of particular interpretive communities; but they do so in the realization that the ground of their interpretations is to be found in their lived lives, and that the perspectives they learn to develop open them to the intersubjective, everyday world.

If, I believe, they enter these provinces or communities with a consciousness of project, a way of inserting themselves into the world, the learning they do will be the learning of persons, of practitioners. Not only will it be a question of the development of mind. There will be an orientation to action, to what Schon calls "reflective practice" or "reflection-in-action."[23] Feeling, intuition, imagination, and practical judgements will all be involved. If teachers do indeed choose themselves as a community of persons ready to take initiatives, prepared to embark on new beginnings, their teaching will become their project; and a project is the means by which one does create identity and even a sense of authorship in the world. To become initiated into the liberal arts in connection with a project is quite different from becoming initiated for the sake of the knowledge itself or for the sake of the development of mind. This provides an argument, it seems to me, for integrating liberal arts education with the fundamentals of teacher education.

John Passmore has written of teaching as a triadic relationship in which someone teaches something to somebody.[24]
Before anybody begins to teach a subject, he says, that person should be encouraged "to think about it in a particular way," to ask what is the point of teaching it at all, and by what criteria the individual is to judge her/his success in teaching it, what part it plays in the general education of a young person, what students can get out of it who are not going to make it their career. To develop a conception of appropriate method and even to understand the kinds of open capacities that can be nurtured in the plurality of the young require a strong sense of grounding in what is to be taught. At the same time, a consciousness of such matters cannot but inform and illuminate the subject matter at hand.

This is partly because, for all the talk of "cultural literacy," teaching is not a matter of communicating content or a set of "facts." Nor is it solely a process of engaging students, as Paul Hirst writes, with "complex conceptual schemes...and the arts and techniques of different types of reasoning and judgment."[25] As I view it, teachers who come to their tasks with recognition that, in their own experience as well as in their students, there is bound to be a tension between the schematized or systematized and what Jerome Bruner calls "the vicissitudes of human intentions,"[26] are teachers who are in search themselves. They are "on to something," as Walker Percy's character says; and they may be able to communicate to their students some of what that signifies. In the general domains of philosophy today, it happens that there is a focal concern with the problem of endowing

experience with meaning in contrast to the more traditional concern with how to know the truth. When Bruner talks about narrative as one of the "modes of thought,"[27] in addition to the paradigmatic logico-scientific mode, he has in mind not merely an attentiveness to the human condition, which is seldom captured by science and logical reasoning. He is talking as well about the diversity of human stories, something that surely has to be taken into account when we try to engage persons in the several "provinces of meaning," the several ways of making sense.

Students can be brought to understand that the disciplines, in the humanities as well as the science, are human constructions. So are what are called the "canons," the standards, the criteria of merit; and, as we have surely learned in recent times, they are open to reconceptualization and to change. Women's studies, Black studies, the new discoveries in Third World literatures and scholarship: all have made us see the exclusionary character of so much that we have called knowledge, even as the works of Gabriel Marquez, Carlos Fuentes, Maya Angelou, Toni Morrison, Maxine Kong Kingston, and (may I add?) Salman Rushdie have provided us new ways of seeing, feeling, and imagining. If we keep in mind that our major concern is with experience and developing perspectives on the worlds we live together, we will not be so troubled about the quantity of the content mastered. We will be concerned, as we should be, with students understanding what it means to enter particular interpretive communities and read (or write, or listen, or represent) according to the rules and principles acknowledged by the interpreters among whom they are choosing to work.

Whether students are reading Tom Jones, Jane Eyre, Moby Dick, Beloved, Love in a Time of Cholera, or Billy Bathgate, they have to recognize that the book before them creates an as/if, an imaginary world which is not to be confused with the commonsense everyday world. There may be disagreements among critics and interpreters about structures, the meaning of meaning, the connection between the text and other texts; but there are certain criteria that are generally recognized. If they are forgotten, if people read Doctorow's Billy Bathgate, for instance, as if it were the long suppressed true account of the gangster Dutch Schultz's criminal career, they are sacrificing an opportunity to see more in their own expanded experience and to achieve the book as meaningful, not simply to register it as factual and check it off against other facts about a gangster who lived half a century ago.

Sartre, reminding his readers of the importance of active involvement with literary texts, spoke of reading as a "synthesis of perception and creation."[28] The object - the printed pages - had to impose its own structures; but the subject - the reader - was needed to disclose that object, to make there be a novel, a work of art. This meant that the reader was "conscious of disclosing in creating, of creating by disclosing"; and, if that reader were "inattentive, tired, stupid, or thoughtless," she/he would never grasp the relations in the book nor realize the meanings to be discovered through the language. Not only does this shed light on interpretive reading; it relates to what many philosophers are saying today about knowing and pursuing meanings, and even what they assert about "reality." In other words, Sartre makes particularly clear the interdependence of subject and object and the important fact that the meanings of a phenomenon (be it a literary text, a street battle, a drug sale, a child's journal, a playground, a shattered window) are contingent on a certain mode of human attending, active attending and active interpretation, not the blank passivity of powerlessness.

I find in what is called "reader reception theory" an approach to interpretive reading closely related to Sartre's and, at once, suggestive of several analogies. According to this theory, any imaginative text has to be achieved as meaningful between, as it were, two

poles: that of the book as written by an author and the subjectivity of a reader. The reader undertakes a kind of concretization. She/he "passes through the various perspectives offered by the text and relates the different views and patterns to one another...."[29] Doing so, the reader "sets the work in motion and so sets himself in motion too." The perspectives offered by the text are those of the author, explicit or not, of the narrative point of view, of the person consciously playing a role as reader, of the patterns created by certain tropes and metaphors, and of the vantage points of the characters in the book. What we find, when we take this approach, is an example of how knowing involves us with constructs and patterns of thinking devised by our forerunners and contemporaries. But we also find that, through looking through what might be called these social schemata or patterns, we can bring into being meanings that are distinctively ours. As an example, we might recall Virginia Woolf's To the Lighthouse, which depends so clearly upon the play of multiple perspectives and impressions of the real. We could not make sense of it at all if we did not participate in some understandings of British university life and social patterns, of the Hebrides as a vacation place, of marriage in all its ambivalence and complex concern, of the First World War and the damage done, of mother-child relationships, of (considering Lily Briscoe) impressionist art, of the conflict set up by gender tensions (window vs. lighthouse; feeling vs. logic; relatedness vs. control). All these are functions of the social construction of knowledge. An immigrant from Cambodia, say, or a part of India untouched by the British, might have a difficult time entering the novel. When a reader shares the author's social reality sufficiently, that reader can look through the various vantage points: Mrs Ramsay's, Mr. Ramsay's, those of the eight Ramsay children, Lily Briscoe's, Charles Tansley's, Minta's, the many others present and absent. Many will not mesh or cohere; the reader's imagination will have to fill in gaps, bridge gulfs between various ways of seeing; but, at the end, that reader will have constituted a distinctive "world," not quite like any other, because it is a world made out of the stuff of the reader's experience. As Iser says, a new experience emerges as our reading reshapes and restructures what we have already stored. What actually happens during this process "can again only be experienced when past feelings, views, and values have been evoked and then made to merge with the new experience. The old conditions the form of the new, the new selectively restructures the old."[30] Iser draws upon John Dewey's work when he says this; so it may not be surprising that the very description of what happens is analogous to descriptions of learning made by Dewey and by ourselves. I would only add, with Paulo Freire in mind, that the process can find a kind of consummation in dialogue or in what Dewey called communication. Sharing the prejudgments, the orientations of a culture, individual persons (all of them social beings) can come together to articulate distinctive perspectives and, through doing so, bring about a restructuring, a renewing of what is held in common. I should like to believe that, through talking about a Woolf novel or any other such many-layered text, talking - as it were - in public, people can constitute something like a new community among themselves. Perhaps, to use Rorty's language, they can add their own voices to the "conversation" that has been going on over the generations[31] and attain a richer reciprocity.

Similar things can happen if they enter into study of the sciences viewed in Stephen Toulmin's terms as another "construal of reality."[32] Surely, they can happen if history is taught, in part to shed light upon contemporary experience in this country and in the world. Imagination can find a place in such a study, as Hayden White has written, if authentic efforts are made to enter sympathetically the "minds or consciousnesses of human agents long dead, to empathize with the intentions and motivations of actors impelled by beliefs and values which may differ totally from anything the historian might himself honor in his own life...."[33] There are a thousand unresolved questions to be held in mind with regard to history as it relates to human memory, exemplifed today by the story of the Holocaust, the Palestinian uprootedness, and the present events on the West Bank. Not only do questions

with respect to these happenings remain open; so do questions about the discipline itself, politics as it plays upon history, the issues of narrativity and truth.

The proponents of "cultural literacy" lament the lack of "background information" respecting the facts of history. Philosophers think of history as continually revealing more and more meanings; and numbers of them focus on particulars in the past, the role of chance, the countless choices that have been made by living human beings, some of whose voices have never been heard. Foucault has reminded us of how history can be done and ought to be done from the ground of our lived landscape, and how, in this domain as well as others, knowledge should be viewed "as perspective"[34] and with an awareness of the contesting voices, the submerged voices, those continually breaking the silences to turn attention to undiscovered aspects of the past. This kind of approach, it seems to me, can be integrated with what we know about the teaching of history in different places and to different youth. Perhaps most important of all, it may empower by communicating a sense of agency as teachers, like their students, reach out from the ground of the lived.

This brings me back to the domain of values, the space in which teachers must concern themselves with choosing according to some conceptions of what is good and what is right. We can call some of the choices that have to be made ethical choices, because they demand critical consideration of how principles are to be regarded, practical judgments in the midst of situations, feelings, anticipations of consequences, concern, commitment, care. For a long time, in the western tradition, the emphasis in this sphere was on the importance of rational autonomy in the making of moral choices and the giving of good reasons for those choices, reasons given relevance by the abstract and generalized rules known as principles. Those who recall the interest in Lawrence Kohlberg's approach to moral education[35] will remember that moral development, in his schema, culminated in the ability to make rational moral choices in the light of the principles of justice and regard for human rights. Most people are aware of the challenge to that view embodied in women's discoveries that female development followed a different course than did males, and that adulthood for women entailed an expansive sense of relatedness, connectedness, and concern for others.[36] Rather than referring to some version of the Golden Rule or to the idea of human rights, women are prone to think in terms of mutuality and responsibility. For Nel Noddings, moral acts are those rooted in memories of caring and being cared for; rational principles are not what move persons to treat one another with decency, kindness, and concern.[37] It is in large measure a matter of being able to look through others' eyes, to realize that others' existential possibilities might well be our own. Appealing though this is, there remains, especially in the widening circles of human relationship, a felt need for some sort of impartialism, for a responsiveness to principles of freedom and equity and regard with implications for every person, no matter how alien, no matter how strange.

In a society marked by so much indifference and carelessness, by technicist values like effectiveness and efficiency, it can be extraordinarily difficult for teachers to feel themselves to be moral agents. Yet, as we know, teachers are continuously confronted with moral and ethical situations that call upon them to decide what is good or right and, in some fashion, to nurture an ethical sensitivity or a formation of conscience in those they teach. Drug addictions, violence, cheating, child abuse, rape: these are the extreme instances of violation in contemporary society. Whether or not they are ever faced with particular instances of such crimes, teachers nonetheless have to choose themselves with respect to them, even as they have to ponder what would constitute a decent and humane public space. They cannot become like the Buchanans in The Great Gatsby - simply "careless people" who "smashed up things and creatures and then retreated back into their money or their vast carelessness, or whatever it was that kept them together and let other people clean up the mess they had made...."[38] Somehow or other, if only because they are

teachers, they have - like Albert Camus's Tarrou in The Plague - to learn a kind of modesty. "All I maintain," he says, "is that on this earth there are pestilences and there are victims, and it's up to us as far as possible, not to join forces with pestilences."[39] And he speaks of the need to exert one's will, to choose integrity and purity.

Now I am aware, often bitterly aware, of how difficult it is to carve out a space to choose - indeed, how difficult it is to think what we are doing in this overly administered, fury-haunted world. But I believe that if teachers in our schools do not confront the moral challenge facing us, the future of our society may be far too much like a "brave new world," a dystopia that might be comfortable for the many but a denial of what we fundamentally believe to be decent and humane. There is a recent book called Accident: A Day's News by Christa Wolf. The day she renders is the day in which the disaster at Chernobyl becomes known in Germany, where the narrator lives in a country place. It is also the day when her beloved brother is having a delicate brain operation. We are presented, therefore, with technology in its two aspects: the gross and destructive, the careless on the one hand; the delicate and restorative on the other. The book deals with fusion rather than fission, with an effort to create some kind of order in experience. Near the beginning, the narrator talks to her daughter, asking her to tell her about the children. She writes of the terrible pictures that keep surging up into her mind: "I was once more forced to admire the way in which everything fits together with a sleepwalker's precision: the desire of most people for a comfortable life, their tendency to believe the speakers on raised platforms and the men in white coats; the addiction to harmony and the fear of contradiction of the many seem to correspond to the arrogance and hunger for power, the dedication to profit, unscrupulous inquisitiveness, and self-infatuation of the few. So what was it that didn't add up in this equation?"[40] She turns to the children, to the look of the grass, to the concreteness and the beauty of the earth and sky. At the end, when she hears her brother has survived, she says: "How difficult it would be, brother, to take leave of this earth."

One of the fundamental challenges, I think, is to study the equation and keep trying to discover what does not "add up." We can do something about the desire to submerge in a comfortable life, the tendency to believe blindly, the dedication to profit, even the self-infatuation of the few. And surely we can do something about loving the earth. It will take imagination; it will require curricula shaped around the several arts, as well as the humanities; it will take the tapping of multiple intelligences. I have tried to suggest that, even in the midst of generalized formulations of instrumental rationality, even with the desire for familiar, calm surfaces, more and more people are coming to understand the sense in which humane learning must refer to the intersubjectively lived world. To say that learning is experiential and grounded is not to take an anti-intellectual position. To link learning to praxis is not to undermine the disciplines nor to distort the perspectives opened by the traditional "forms of life." It is still possible to take a view of teacher education as a dimension of liberal education conceived as anti-foundational, dialogical, responsive to vantage points and, at once, involve students with the great "conversation" as it moves on over time. But the subject matter of the conversation, like the substance of the interpreted world, should never be subsumed under the taken-for-granted. Sartre wrote "if I am given this world with its injustices, it is not so that I might contemplate them coldly, but that I might animate them with my indignation, that I might disclose them...as injustices, that is, as abuses to be suppressed."[41] It is when we identify injustices, deficiencies, vacancies, that we are moved to create values and, indeed, to act to secure them as we act in the name of change.

I would like to see the perspectives we open through interpretive study and critique allowing more and more students to perceive the kinds of alternatives that might allow them to reach out in passion and in thoughtfulness to transform and to repair. I would like

to see public spaces opening out and young people being enabled to speak in their own voices in the presence of others, as they try from their multiple locations to bring into being a common world. This is the philosopher's voice responding to "queer questions," trying to provoke others to think what they are doing, knowing there is no stopping place, aware that the search goes on.

1. Isaiah Berlin, "The Purpose of Philosophy," Insight (Nigeria) 1 No 1 (July 1962), pp. 12-15, reprinted in New York Times Sunday Magazine, Nov. 4, 1962, p. 23.

2. Alfred Schutz, "Making Music Together," Collected Papers II, Studies in Social Theory (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), pp. 77-178.

3. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 5.

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